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INSTRUCTING POLICE OFFICERS IN
THE CRIMINAL LAW
Daniel P. A. Sweeney and Louis L. Roos
(This is the second of several articles titled "Instructing Police Officers
in the Criminal Law," by Captain Sweeney and Lt. Roos, ito appear in this
Journal. The first of the articles will be found in the January-February, 1945,
issue.-Editor.)
As a general proposition, common law crimes have been
abolished by the various state" legislatures throughout the country.
The practical result effected by these changes is that no act or
omission is a crime unless it is declared to be such by statutory
enactment. No matter what the act may be, no matter how re-
prehensible, an accused person cannot be legally convicted of a
crime or offense unless some statute or regulation forbids the
doing of such act, or commands its performance, and provides a
fitting punishment. The salutary effect of incorporating all crimes
and offenses into statutory enactments is readily apparent when
considered in the light of protecting the citizenry from needless
and unlawful arrests. The codification of crimes and offenses
into specific criminal statutes is advantageous to both the public
and law enforcement officers for in such cases all concerned know
exactly what duties and powers are imposed and the nature and
quality of the offense in question.
Felonies, Misdemeanors, Offenses
Unlawful acts, in so far as the gravity of the violations are
concerned, fall into the following three groups: felonies, mis-
demeanors and offenses. A felony is a more serious crime punish-
able upon conviction by death, imprisonment and/or fine. A mis-
demeanor is a less serious crime and usually merits fine and/or
imprisonment upon conviction. An offense is not a crime and
consists of a forbidden act, the punishment usually being a small
fine, a short imprisonment, or both.
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Not infrequently, legislatures in enacting criminal statutes,
forbid the doing of certain acts but neglect to prescribe any
punishment or designate the degree of crime. In such cases re-
course must be made to other general sections covering the sub-
ject matter. In New York, the legislature has enacted Section 29
of the Penal Law which states in substance that where the per-
formance of an act is prohibited by a statute, and no penalty
is imposed in such statute, the doing of the act is a misdemeanor.
Section 1937 of the same state law provides that where the statute
declares the violation to be a misdemeanor and no other punish-
ment is provided for, then such violation shall be punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not
more than five hundred dollars, or by both. Section 541 of the
United States Code Annotated provides that all offenses which
may be punished by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, shall be deemed felonious. All other offenses are mis-
demeanors except those which do not exceed confinement in a
common jail, without hard labor for six months, or a fine of
not more than five hundred dollars, or both, which shall be deemed
petty offenses.
The general rule applicable, therefore, is that if the punish-
ment prescribed in the particular case exceeds a term of im-
prisonment for one year, the crime is a felony. This may be true
despite the fact that the statute itself declares the crime to be
a misdemeanor. The New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Bellinger' held that a statute which prescribed a term of im-
prisonment for two years and designated the offense a misde-
meanor, was in fact a felony entitling the defendant to a trial
by jury. Such cases should not be confused with instances where
the section makes the first offense a misdemeanor, and the second,
a felony. Here the first offense may be punished by .imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding one year, but the second, for a
longer period of time.
The vital importance of knowing what are felonies and lesser
crimes and offenses cannot be overemphasized. The police officer
must be able to distinguish them. This is particularly true in
relation to the law of arrest and the lawful use of force to be
applied in effecting such arrests. Police officers are guardians of
the public peace, health and welfare and as such are entrusted
with the necessary powers to carry their functions and duties.
These powers are not unlimited but are restricted by well defined
statutory limitations. Abuse of these powers may lead to discipli-
nary measures either in the form of departmental action, criminal
prosecution or civil proceedings.
1269 N. Y. 265.
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Arrest Authority of the Police
In many states, like New York, a peace officer may, without
court process, arrest in the following cases: For any crime com-
mitted or attempted in his presence; when the person arrested
has committed a felony, although not in his presence; when a
felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable grounds
for believing the person to be arrested has committed it. Under
such circumstances, the officer may break into a building to-
make an arrest if, after notice of his office and purpose, he is
refused admittance.
Force may be used in making an arrest when it is necessarily
committed by a peace officer in the performance of a legal duty.
Such force, however, must be reasonable in manner and moderate
in degree depending on the circumstances. If the force used
should result in death, a homicide is committed and unless justi-
fiable, may result in criminal prosecution. Under Section 1055
of the Penal Law of the State of New York, a homicide is justi-
fiable when committed by a public officer, necessarily, in retaking
a prisoner who has committed, or has been arrested for, or con-
victed of a felony, and who has escaped or has been rescued,
or in arresting a person who has committed a felony and is fleeing
from justice; or in attempting by lawful ways and means to
apprehend a person for a felony actually committed, or in law-
fully suppressing a riot, or in lawfully preserving the peace.
It will be noted from the above that without court process
a peace officer cannot arrest in the usual case, unless the crime
was committed in his presence, except in the case of felonies
under the conditions specified. In the case of justifiable homicide,
the police officer is excused if the crime designated is a felony,
lawfully suppressing a riot or lawfully preserving the peace. This-
section does not mention misdemeanors generally or other offenses.
Hence, if as a result of the force used the death of the prisoner
ensues, the police officer is subject to a charge of homicide. Peace
officers, therefore, in order to properly uphold the law and protect
themselves from criminal and civil proceedings, must acquaint
themselves thoroughly with these provisions of law.
Crimes and Offenses Mala in se Malx Prohibita
All statutes dealing with crimes and offenses may be said to
fall into two general categories, viz. mal in se and maa pro-
hibita. The latter class comprises a vast number of acts which
would not be wrong were they not prohibited by statute. A crime
malum prohibitum is not naturally an evil, but becomes so in con-
sequence of its being forbidden by law. This class is made up
largely of misdemeanors and offenses since in the majority of
cases felonies are crimes which are naturally and inherently evil
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and consequently fall into the mala in se group.
In the absence of any language in a malum prohibitum statute
requiring proof of knowledge or intent, an offender may be con-
victed merely on a showing that he did the prohibited act. His
intent, motive or even ignorance of the law constitutes no defense.
This class of statutes does not make the liability of the accused
depend on any factor other than the doing of the specified act.
Other considerations such as good faith, lack of intent, ignorance
of the law, etc., may be urged in mitigation of punishment, but
are immaterial on the question of guilt or innocence. Instances
of such statutes are conducting businesses without the required
licenses, driving without a permit, gambling violations, violations
of the liquor laws, etc.
Mala in se statutes on the other hand generally require proof
of criminal intent. Failing this, a prima facie case cannot be es-
tablished. An offense malum in se is properly defined as one
which is naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a civilized
community. Since this class of crime generally involves infamy
and moral turpitude, legislatures in enacting such criminal stat-
utes provide that persons shall not be convicted of such viola-
tions unless it is clearly proven that they intended to commit
such acts. A criminal intent may be inferred by the jury, or in
the absence of the latter, by the court, from the facts in the case.
The criminal intent is generally inferable whenever the means
used are such as would ordinarily result in the commission of
the forbidden act. The quantum of proof required in this group
of crimes is, therefore, greater than that required in mala pro-
hibita statutes.
"Presence" As a Means of Establishing Knowledge
The presence of the accused at the scene of the crime is usually
sufficient to establish knowledge where the facts in the *case show
that the defendant was in a position to observe the violation or
should have known about it. Knowledge in these cases is imputed
from the factual situation. Difficulty arises, however, in proving
knowledge, where the accused is not and ordinarily would not
be present at the premises in question. These types of cases arise
where the statute makes the owner, agent or lessee of the building
liable for permitting the premises to be maintained in violation
of law. Frequently, these designated persons know nothing of
such conditions, transacting all their business by mail and not
even visiting the premises except in isolated instances. The
burden of proving knowledge in these cases is, without question,
a troublesome one.
In New York City the Police Department has overcome the
difficulty of proving knowledge in these cases to a considerable
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extent. After an arrest takes place in the premises, whether
it be the tenant, a patron or both, a police officer serves a notice
on the landlord or his agent informing him of such arrest and
calling on them to abate such unlawful conditions by dispossessing
the tenant or by other lawful means. This notice is referred to
as a Liability Notice and is usually served in instances where
arrests have been made for violations of law with respect to
public morals, gambling, intoxicating liquors and public nuisances.
Printed on such notice is the section of law which places re-
sponsibility on the owner or agent to eliminate and suppress
these violations of law. Police officers make personal service of
these notices, and then file a copy with report in their Commands
for future use.
Where several arrests resulting in .convictions have been ob-
tained in the tenant's premises and the owner or agent fails
to take action to abate the condition, application is made to the
proper criminal court for a court summons charging the owner
or agent with knowingly permitting the premises to be used for
unlawful purposes. The bases of such knowledge are the Lia-
bility Notices which were served by the Police Department after
each occurrence.
In the interest of crime prevention, it is much more desirable
to attack crime at its source by absolute suppression rather than
to punish offenders after the law has been violated. In this
respect police officers have found that ancient adage "an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure," abounding in wisdom and
good common sense. The policy of the New York City Police De-
partment, therefore, is to seek the cooperation of the landlord in
securing the removal of such tenants rather than to prosecute
him criminally. In this way, the breeding places of crime are
eliminated and opportunity and temptation greatly curtailed. In
keeping with this policy, if the landlord indicates his desire to
cooperate by instituting action to oust the tenant in a civil court,
an adjournment is requested for the case in the criminal court
to give the owner or agent time and opportunity to complete the
dispossess proceedings. If the landlord or agent in good faith
proceeds to oust the tenant, whether successful or not, the criminal
prosecution is dropped on motion to the court by the defense.
Should the landlord prove uncooperative, the criminal action is
then diligently prosecuted.
Intent and Motive Distinguished
Criminal knowledge or intent is often confused with motive
by police officers. Motive may be defined as that which leads or
tempts the mind to commit the criminal act. This is distinguish-
able from intent, the purpose of which is to use a particular means
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to effect a certain result. Motive, although always relevant, is
never essential in proving the guilt of the defendant. Motive is
important only when the evidence in the case as submitted by
the prosecution, is weak. However, it must be understood that
an accused should not be acquitted simply because his motive
for perpetrating the act cannot be ascertained.
Principals, Accomplices and Accessories
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime are either
principals or accessories. This is true irrespective of what other
name may be designated. A principal or an accomplice is a person
who is concerned in the commission of a crime whether he directly
commits the act or aids and abets its commission, and whether
present or absent, directly or indirectly .counsels, commands, in-
duces or procures another to commit a crime. In some jurisdic-
tions, to constitute a person a principal in a crime, he must be
present aiding by acts, words or gestures and consenting to the
commission of the crime. In New York, by statutory enactment,
this is not essential as the statute, in express terms, makes it
immaterial whether the accused is present or absent.
It is not sufficient to charge one with being a principal in a
crime that the crime was in pursuance of his advice, counsel or
encouragement unless it was induced thereby. Mere approval of
an unlawful act about to be perpetrated, does not constitute the
person who approved, a principal. A person who advises, coun-
sels or induces another to commit a crime cannot escape criminal
liability by simply withdrawing and abandoning the enterprise.
He is placed in pari delicto with the other participants until he
renounces the common purpose and clearly advises the others
that he has done so and does not intend to participate further.
An accessory is a person who, having knowledge or reasonable
cause to believe that another has committed a felony, harbors,
conceals or aids the offender with intent that he may avoid or
escape arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. It is to be noted
from the definition that an accused can only be an accessory when
a felony has been committed. In the absence of statutory enact-
ment, the common law (by which all concerned in the commission
of a misdemeanor may be convicted principals) prevails. One
charged with a misdemeanor may be convicted either on proof of
his being a principal or on proof of his being an accessory. In
New York, by statute, all concerned in the commission of a mis-
demeanor are principals.
In some jurisdictions by legislation, an accessory to a felony
may be tried in the county where he became an accessory or where
the felony was committed and may be convicted regardless of
whether the principal has or has not been convicted, or is not
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amenable to justice, or has been convicted and pardoned, or other-
wise discharged after conviction. It is not essential under this
statute that a criminal proceeding be pending against the principal.
Persons Liable for Criminal Responsibility
Persons who have reached the age of criminal responsibility,
who are mentally capable, and who act of their own free will, are
liable for the commission of their criminal acts. This proposition
is predicated on the free volition of the agent and does not include
instances where the freedom of the will is impaired by surrounding
consideration such as duress, self-defense, insanity, etc. The
age of criminal responsibility varies throughout the country but
the age of seven seems to have been adopted as a general rule.
Consequently a child under the age of seven is conclusivly pre-
sumed to be incapable of committing a crime. A child between
the ages of seven and twelve is presumed to be incapable, but this
presumption is rebuttable and may be overcome by proving that
he has sufficient capacity to understand the nature of the act, and
to know that it is wrong. A child between twelve and sixteen is
presumed to be capable, but instead of being charged with a
crime, he is charged with juvenile delinquency unless the act com-
mitted was one which may be punished by death or life imprison-
ment, in which case he is charged with the crime itself. This is
the law in the State of New York, other jurisdictions varying in
relation to the ages prescribed.
By Section 2186 of the New York State Penal Law, an adult
concerned in the commission of a crime in which a child between
the ages of seven and sixteen is also involved as principal or
accessory in the same manner as if the child was over sixteen
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. Such a
statute obviates any defense which might be offered to the effect
that if one principal or accessory in a crime cannot be charged
with the crime, then the other principal or accessory, being in
parl delicto, likewise should not be held criminally responsible.
What Constitutes an Attempt
An attempt to commit a crime is defined as an act done with
intent to commit a crime, and tending but failing to effect its
commission. The question as to what constitutes an attempt is
often intricate and difficult of determination. An attempt to
commit a crime is any overt act done with the criminal intent
in mind and which, if it were not for the intervention of some
other cause preventing the carrying out of the intent, would have
consummated in the commission of a crime.
An attempt consists of two essential elements, a criminal intent
and an overt act. It follows, then, that mere preparation or
intention to commit a specified crime does not amount to an
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attempt. It would seem to follow from the definition of an
attempt that a failure to consummate the crime is a material
element and consequently, when the crime is completed, there
could be no prosecution for the attempt. According to Section
260 of the Penal Law, in New York, a person may be convicted
of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial
that the crime was consummated, unless the court, in its discretion,
discharges the jury and directs the defendant to be tried for the
crime itself.
In relation to an overt act,_an attempt is an endeavor to do an
act carried beyond mere preparation but falling short of execu-
tion. It is necessary to prove that the defendant, with the intent of
committing the particular crime, did some overt act adapted to,
approximating, and which in the ordinary and likely course of
things, will result in the commission of such crime. The overt act
necessary to constitute the attempt need not be the final one
towards the completion of the offense. It must, however, ap-
proach sufficiently near to it to stand either as the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement toward the commission of
the offense after the preparations are made. The doctrine
enunciated is that the acts would ih all reasonable probability
have resulted in the crime itself but for some interference in
preventing it.
An excellent illustration of what does not constitute an
attempt may be found in the case of People v. Rizzo.2 In
that case the defendant, with others, planned and intended to
commit a robbery. Defendant started out with his companions
who were armed, from a designated place looking for the intended
victim who was carrying a pay-roll. Apparently knowing the
route which the victim would take, they first went to the bank
from which he was supposed to obtain the money and then went
to various other buildings along the route. Their activities
aroused the suspicions of two police officers who watched and
followed their movements. When about to be apprehended, the
defendant jumped from the car and ran into a building from
which he was brought by the officers. The other occupants of the
car were also arrested. The culprits had not found or seen the
man they had intended to rob up to the time of their arrest. The
court here held there was no attempt to commit the crime of
robbery within the meaning of the law because there was no act
done which could be said to be in furtherance of the specified crime.
In view of the fact that the defendants did not overtake the
intended victim and were never in his presence, there could have
been no act committed by the defendants which could have been
2246 N. Y. 334.
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in furtherance of an assault and larcency, the components of
robbery. The court ruled in substance that all the acts proven
against the defendants only amounted to preparation.
It is understandable why cases such as this confuse and puzzle
police officers. It is as much their duty to prevent crime as it is
to detect crime and apprehend criminals after the crime has been
committed. Any reasonable person would readily admit that the
defendant in the Rizzo case, who was the only one to take an
appeal from conviction, would have perpetrated a crime of vio-
lence except for the timely interference of the police officers. The
only factor that saved him from committing a crime was the fact
that he did not have sufficient time to overtake the intended
victim before he was arrested. Police alertness saved the day for
him. From a practical viewpoint it would seem to have been
better for the police officers in question to have permitted him to
continue on his nefarious mission, commit the robbery, and then
to have made the arrest. In this way the defendant could not
have escaped just retribution and would have been confined in
prison to the great relief of society. But the police officers' creed
could not permit this, for in committing the crime, there may have
been bloodshed. Their sworn duty to prevent crime and protect
life and property could not be sacrificed for a conviction.
The law underlying the decisions pertaining to an attempt to
commit a crime is a salutary one. Very few people, sometimes
throughout the course of their lives, are not tempted in some way
to commit an act which is a violation of law. Not infrequently,
the individual is formulating plans and making preparations to
commit the crime before he realizes the meaning of his acts.
Slight reflection on his contemplated course of action plus the
possibility of ensuing criminal prosecution, causes such individual
to immediately abandon his preparations and banish the scheme
from his mind. A common illustration where even the most honest
fall into temptation because of the opportunity afforded, is an
instance where lost property is found in some public place and
the law requires that it be deposited with some public custodian.
Finders have often been tempted to appropriate such articles to
their own use and have frequently. secreted them in some tem-
porary hiding place with that intent in mind. But the portent
of their actions then manifests itself and causes them to make
immediate restitution. In like manner, how many law abiding
citizens have not at some time or other... and probably with go6d
cause.., felt the inclination to commit an assault on some obstrep-
erous individual, ^and have gone so far as to clench their fists
and stride toward the individual before checking their impulses.
If the law governing attempts to commit crime was otherwise,
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and only required the criminal intent plus preparation, all of these
individuals would be guilty of a crime. The law as presently
constituted does not indulge in such strict and harsh interpreta-
tions.
One further point should be stressed in discussing the law on
attempts to commit crime. A defendant cannot protect himself
from criminal responsibility by showing that by reason of some
fact unknown to him at the time of his criminal attempt it could
not be carried out. A common case demonstrating this rule is
the pickpocket who puts his hand in another's pocket for the
purpose of perpetrating a larceny but finds nothing there. The
courts have found such defendants guilty on the theory that the
accused has done his utmost to effect the commission of the crime
but fails to accomplish it for some cause beyond his control or
knowledge. The criminal intent to commit the particular crime
plus some act performed tending to accomplish it, is all that is
required in such cases.
Entrapment
The defense of entrapment occasionally arises in criminal cases
because of some act that the police officer did in order to secure
necessary evidence. Criminals are often protected in their activi-
ties by a large class of citizens because the latter do not favor
certain laws which have been enacted for their protection. A
typical example of such a case would be the laws pertaining to
gambling. Consequently, police officers do not receive the same
public cooperation usually forthcoming in other classes of crimes.
On occasion, therefore, due to the fact that these criminals work
in secrecy, they must resort to various artifices in order to enforce
the law and arrest the violators. It often becomes necessary at
such times for the officers to pose as criminals themselves in order
to gain the confidence of such individuals and obtain the evidence
necessary to convict. It is under these circumstance6 that the
question of entrapment usually arises.
Police officers are not permitted to procure another to commit
a crime in order to prosecute him for the crime committed. How-
ever, there is a very clear distinction between procuring or in-
ducing another to commit a crime and setting a trap for him
after he has executed a criminal act of his own design. If the
criminal intent originated in the mind of the accused, the fact
that police officers furnished the opportunity to commit the crime
in order to prosecute him for it, is no defense. Artifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal
enterprise. If the criminal intent originated in the mind of a
police officer and the accused is lured into committing the crime,
no conviction can be had. If the defendant, according to a design
of his own choosing commits the act with the cooperation of the
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police officer, who does not participate in any act constituting the
crime itself, no entrapment lies. A police officer who attempts to
detect the commission of crime in others must himself stop short
of lending assistance, or participation in the commission of the
crime. It may, therefore, be stated as a general rule that if the
criminal intent was present in the mind of the accused before
the advent of the police officer, and then the criminal offense is
completed, the fact that opportunity is furnished or that the
accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure
the essential evidence to convict him, no defense or entrapment
will prevail.
When Prosecutions May be Initiated
In the absence of some statutory limitation, a prosecution may
be instituted at any time after the commission of the crime. The
majority of states have enacted statutes limiting the time for the
commencement of the criminal proceedings. These laws vary in
their terms. In New York there is no limitation for murder and
kidnaping. In felony cases the prosecution must be commenced
within five years after the commission of the felony. In misde-
meanor cases, a two year period of limitation is provided. In the
same jurisdiction an action is deemed commenced when an infor-
mation is laid before a magistrate charging the commission of a
crime and a warrant of arrest is issued by him, or when an
indictment is duly presented by the Grand Jury in open court,
and there received and filed. Under such circumstances, an arrest
may be made and the defendant prosecuted at any time. If at the
time the crime is committed, the defendant is outside the boun-
daries of the state, the statute of limitations is tolled until he
returns into the state. Likewise, if after the criminal act has been
perpetrated, the accused departs from the state or remains within
the state under a false name, the time for commencing the action
is also tolled until his return or until he again lives publicly under
his true name. In criminal cases statutes of limitation create a
bar to prosecution if timely objection is made on the trial.
Double Jeopardy
The Constitution of the United States and the Constitutions
of a majority of the states contain a provision that no person shall
be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. This
provision, in many instances, has been carried over into statute
law by the various legislatures throughout the country. The pro-
hibition not only forbids a second punishment for the same crime,
but it is more extensive in prohibiting a second trial for the same
offense, without regard to whether the accused has suffered pun-
ishment, or has been acquitted or convicted.
The provision of the United States Constitution relating to
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double jeopardy applies only to proceedings in the Federal courts
over crimes committed within their respective jurisdictions and
does not in any way bind the jurisdiction of the state courts over
state crimes. Hence a single act which violates both federal and
state criminal laws results in an offense against two separate
sovereignties and, in the absence of statute to the contrary, may
be prosecuted in both jurisdictions without subjecting the accused
to double jeopardy. In New York, by Section 33 of the Penal Law,
if it appears on the trial of an indictment that the defendant has
been tried in a court of another jurisdiction and has been acquitted
or convicted on the merits, such former acquittal or conviction is a
sufficient defense to the charge.
The plea of double jeopardy is a defense which must be
pleaded and proven. It may be waived expressly by stipulation,
or impliedly, by not pleading it in due time. It can only be raised
where the court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues
at the former trial. Consequently, the discharge of a person ac-
cused of a criminal offense by a magistrate at the close of a pre-
liminary examination is not such an adjudication in his favor as
to bar a subsequent prosecution for the offense.
The defense of jeopardy can only be availed of where it is
shown that the second prosecution is for the same act and crime,
both in law and in fact for which the first prosecution was insti-
tuted. The crimes need not be identical; substantial identity is
sufficient. As a general rule it may be stated that it must appear
the defendant upon the first charge could have been convicted
upon the offense in the second. The test of identity of offenses
therefore, is whether the same evidence is required to sustain
them, if not, then there are two separate and distinct offenses
where two are defined by statutes.
Jeopardy attaches when the accused is put on trial before a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person of
the defendant, on an indictment or information sufficient in form
to sustain a conviction and the jury has been impaneled and
sworn. In the case of a non-jury criminal trial, the swearing of
a witness and the giving of any actual testimony by him are con-
sidered as putting the accused in jeopardy. Under these circum-
stances an accused cannot again be tried for the same offense even
though the trial is not carried through to completion, unless some
statute permits such a procedure. Sections 428 and 430 of the
New York Code of Criminal Procedure permits the court to dis-
charge the jury before they have agreed on a verdict and to again
try the case before another term of the court, where some casualty
or injury occurs to the defendant, the jury or some one of them, or
the court and this renders it inexpedient to keep them longer to-
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gether; or the jury after a reasonable time is unable to reach a
verdict; or the public prosecutor and counsel for the defendant
consent to such discharge.
Withdrawal of Complaint from Pending Case
It frequently happens that police officers are confronted with
situations where the complaining witness refuses to press the
complaint against the accused and desires to entirely withdraw
from the pending case. The reasons most often ascribed for this
course of behavior is the fact that the accused has made or is will-
ing to make complete reparation for the wrong committed, either
in the way of a financial settlement in the case of personal injury
or property damage, or some other benefit commensurate with
the wrong perpetrated, such as a promise of marriage in rape and
seduction cases. Under these circumstances, a police officer
through ignorance of the law, might very well become a principal
to compounding a crime by counseling or permitting these ar-
rangements to take effect.
Compounding a Crime
The offense of compounding a crime consists in a person tak-
ing money or other property, gratuity or reward, or an engage-
ment or promise therefor, upon an agreement or understanding,
express or implied, to compound or conceal a crime, or a violation
of statute, or to abstain from, discontinue, or delay, a prosecution
therefor, or to withhold any evidence thereof, except in a case
where a compromise is allowed by law. In some jurisdictions, if
the agreement or understanding relates to a felony, then com-
pounding such crime is a felony; otherwise, the crime is a mis-
demeanor. In New York, by statute, a crime may be compromised
when a defendant is brought before a magistrate on a charge of
misdemeanor, for which the person injured by the act constituting
the crime has a remedy by a civil action except when the act was
committed by or upon an officer or justice, while in the execution
of the duties of his office, or riotously, or with an intent to com-
mit a felony. The magistrate is empowered, in his discretion, on
payment of costs and expenses incurred, to order all proceedings
stayed and the defendant discharged. In such event the order is-
sued is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
No course of instruction to police officers would be complete
unless the specific criminal statutes which they are charged with
enforcing are analyzed and completely discussed. Each crime
should be broken up into its component parts and each ele-
ment demonstrated and explained. Judicial interpretation of
these criminal statutes should receive much attention. The quan-
tum of proof and the type of evidence necessary to convict must
be covered in the syllabus. Police officers should not be left to
their own resources in interpreting criminal statutes. The more
time and emphasis placed on this phase of the course, the more
efficient the personnel undergoing the training.
